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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 34 AUTUMN 1959 NUMBER 3
WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1959
The following articles, the work of the faculty of the School of Law
and a member of the Washington Bar, constitute the first academic
comment on the laws of 1959. For obvious reasons, these articles are
not represented to the reader as a complete survey of the legislative
session. Rather, they are merely a compilation of comments on acts
which the writers have found to be important, timely, or merely
interesting.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Administrative Procedures Act. A vast improvement in the
state of administrative law and the quality of government in Wash-
ington was made possible when the State Administrative Procedure Acte
was adopted. Whether the full benefits of this legislation are realized
depends not only upon the cooperative response of state officers and
agencies, but also upon the diligence of the practicing bar in ensuring
compliance with the provisions of the act.
Fortunately, for the assistance it affords in understanding the new
legislation, the Washington act is based upon the Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, which was approved by the Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946. The model act has been
enacted in five other states,2 and substantial portions of comparable
legislation of other states find their source in provisions of the model
I-Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234.
2The annotations to the MoDEL STATE ATEmlsmATMV PROCEDURE AcT list the
following states as jurisdictions adopting the act: Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. 9C UiFOax LAWS ANN. 14 (Supp. 1958).
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act.' While litigation under the act does not appear to have been
heavy, some case authority for the specific application of various pro-
visions may be found. More important, the model act has been the
subject of a number of scholarly law review articles which helpfully
explain and discuss its various provisions in considerable detail."
However, the Washington act is not an identical copy of the model
act. A number of provisions of the Washington act were drawn from
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act where that statute was con-
sidered to be superior.' Other portions of the Washington act are do-
mestic legislative products.6 Moreover, throughout the act changes
of phraseology were made, some with minor effect, and others of con-
siderable importance.'
Basic to an understanding of the Administrative Procedure Act is
recognition that administrative agencies perform the functions of the
three traditional departments of government: the executive, the legis-
lative, and the judicial. Those sections of the act relating to rule-
making are concerned with the functions performed by administrative
agencies under delegations of legislative authority. Those sections of
the act relating to agency action in what are defined as "contested
cases" are concerned with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers of
agencies.! The act is little concerned with the performance of what
might be called executive functions of the agencies, but it does deal
9 Kenneth Culp Davis lists the following states as having statutes which borrow
generously from the model act: Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wis-
consin. DAvis, ADwMiNsTRATI Lw CAsEs 572 (1959). (Note the disagreement over
what constitutes adoption and what is merely borrowing.)
A Schwartz, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 WASH. L. Rxv. 1
(1958) ; Schwartz, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Analysis and
Critique, 7 Ruits L REV. 431 (1953) ; Symposium on the Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. Rzv. 193-375 (1948). The latter symposium contains a
very valuable article by Dean Stason of Michigan, Stason, The Model Administrative
Procedure Act, 33 IowA L REV. 196 (1948). See also, Harris, Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure: Comparative State Legislation, 6 0a.A. L. Rxv. 29 (1953).
aSection 2 (3) of the Washington act, which is concerned with the content of the
notice of proposed rule-making, was taken from Section 4 (a) of the federal act, 5
U.S.C. § 1003 (a). Section 9 (2) of the Washington act, which enumerates powers of
agencies and their designated agents in the hearings in contested cases was taken from
Section 7 (b) of the federal act, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (b).
6 Sections 35 (4), (5), (6) ; and 19.
T To note the variations, compare the following sections of the Washington act
with their counterparts in the model act: Sections 2 (1); 4 (2); 7 (2); 11; 12;
13 (1), (2), (3), (6). The more significant changes of phraseology are discussed,
infra.8 Fuchs, The Model Act's Division of Administrative Proceedings into Rule-Making
and Contested Cases, 33 IowA L. REV. 210 (1948); Trautman, Administrative Law
Problems of Delegation and Implementation in Washington, 33 WASH. L. Rsv. 33
(1958).
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with the relationship between the agencies and the courts by estab-
lishing opportunities for, and standards of, judicial review.
Provisions relating to rule-making-the legislative junction. The
analogy between rule-making and legislation becomes apparent in the
act's definition of a rule. Section 1(2) provides:
"Rule" includes every regulation, standard, or statement of policy
or interpretation of general application and future effect, including
the amendment or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency, whether with
or without prior hearing, to implement or make specific the law en-
forced or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure,
but does not include regulations which concern only the internal man-
agement of the agency and do not directly affect the rights of or pro-
cedures available to the public.
Thus, like statutes, rules are of general applicability, and are not
formulated as the particularized solution of an individual problem.
Like statutes, rules are of future applicability, and do not have im-
mediate consequences for particular individuals without further pro-
ceedings. As with statutes, the validity of rules does not depend upon
the particularized facts of any previous transaction. Instead they are
formulated as policy to govern future events. As in the case of legisla-
tion, individuals have no constitutional right to a hearing before the
adoption of a rule.'
The act does not undertake to limit or broaden the substantive
rule-making powers of administrative agencies. To determine the
substantive basis for agency rules it will still be necessary to have
reference to the statutes conferring substantive powers on the agencies
and to the constitutional principles governing the delegation of legisla-
tive power1 However, the act does set up a number of rule-making
procedures with which agencies must comply in the exercise of their
substantive powers.
Agencies are required to adopt rules of procedure and to publish
descriptive statements of procedures to assist parties appearing before
them. Prior to engaging in rule-making activities agencies are required
to file notice thereof with the Code Reviser, and to otherwise publish
notice of intended rule-making activity, affording interested persons
the opportunity to submit data or views, either orally or in writing.
The required notice should state the time and place of public rule-
9 Senior Citizens League, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Security, 38 Wn2d 142, 228 P2d
478 (1951); Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (1920);
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).10 Trautnan, 4upra, note 8.
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making proceedings; it should contain a reference to the statutory
authority under which the rule is proposed; and it should set out
either the terms or the substance of the proposed rules.11
These procedural requirements obviously democratize the rule-
making process by allowing participation of those governed in the
formulation of the rules. In addition to satisfying this ideological
objective, practical results of better rules may be expected when
agencies are informed of possible unforeseen and undesirable effects
of the proposed rules which can be avoided without sacrifice of the
basic objectives. 2 In this respect, the act opens new avenues of prac-
tice for lawyers who may undertake to protect their clients' interests
by participation in the rule-making process rather than in litigation
over the impact of rules formulated without consideration of their
effect on the clients involved.' 3
Emergency rules may be promulgated without compliance with these
rule-making procedures established by the act if the agency makes a
finding, incorporated in the emergency rule, that immediate adoption
or amendment of the rule is necessary for preservation of the public
health, safety, or general welfare.1 However, such rules are effective
for no more than ninety days.
All rules adopted by agencies are to be filed with the Code Reviser,
and, except for emergency rules, they do not become effective until
thirty days after filing."5 The Code Reviser is directed to compile and
index all the rules so filed, and to publish revisions or supplements to
the compiled rules at least once every two years."6 In addition, the
Code Reviser is directed to publish a monthly bulletin, setting forth
all the rules filed with him during the preceding month.17 Copies of
the compilations and monthly bulletins are to be supplied free to each
"1 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 2 (3). The portion of this section dealing with
the content of the notice was taken from Section 4 (a) of the FEmDAL ADrhNistRA-
lIrE PRomDuRE Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (a).
12 See, for example, Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, 157-162 (March 1955), TAsx FoRcE REPORT oi- LEGAL SERvicFs
AND PRocFuRx, recommending that public participation in rule-making be afforded
wherever practicable, and recommending repeal of some of the exemptions from public
rule-making requirements now found in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.33 For a valuable account of the lawyer's role in this respect at the federal level, see
HoRsKy, THE WAsHINGTON LAwYER (1952).
"-Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 3.
' 
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 4 (2). The comparable provision of the model
act provides that regulations become effective upon filing. The Washington act is
believed to be superior in postponing effectiveness, thus permitting the regulated parties
opportunity to make necessary adjustments.
2 'Wash. Sess. Laves 1959, c. 234, § 5 (1).
7X.Vash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 5 (2).
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county law library, and additional copies are to be sold at cost to
interested parties. 8
Rules which have been so filed and published are to be judicially
noticed, thus greatly simplifying the present problem of proving the
existence of an administrative rule. 9
In view of the very sizeable burden imposed upon agencies to codify
and supplement their existing rules and the burden imposed upon the
Code Reviser in editing and publishing the rules filed with him, the
effective date for these rule-making provisions was delayed until one
year after enactment of the law."0
Provisions Relating to Contested Cases-The Quasi-Judicial Func-
tion. The definition of a contested case is found in Section 1 (3) of the
act.
The section provides: "'Contested case' means a proceeding before
an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after an agency hearing."
An analogy between the judicial function and the administrative
function is clear, as in the case of legislation and rule-making. Con-
tested cases, like cases tried in the courts, involve the rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties. As with cases tried in court, contested
cases will most frequently turn upon the particular and individualized
facts of previous transactions. They will usually involve the pro-
nouncement of a judgment upon past events and, like the judgment of
courts, will have immediate consequences for particular parties unless
review proceedings are undertaken. In some cases, however, as in the
granting of licenses or the setting of rates, contested cases will also
involve prospective operations or future activities of individuals.
However, a contested case does not arise upon every occasion in
which an agency takes action affecting an individual. Such a case
arises only if law-usually a statute-or the Constitution requires an
agency hearing. Some agency actions are undertaken in summary
fashion without hearing, and their validity and consequences are de-
termined later in court review of the action. Most frequently this
18 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 5 (4). The model act contains no comparable
provision for distribution of compilations and bulletins to county law libraries.
19 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 5 (6). The model act does not contain a com-
parable provision.20 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 18.21 E.g. Suspension of a driver's license pursuant to RCW 46.20290 does not involve
a hearing by the Director of Licenses. The propriety of such action is determined in
court review provided by RCW 4620.340. For classic examples of summary adminis-
1959]
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will occur where the governing statutes make no provision for an
agency hearing. The absence of a statutory provision requiring an
agency hearing does not, however, eliminate the possibility that the
action will fall within the definition of a contested case in view of the
constitutional doctrine which prohibits the delegation of legislative
or executive functions to constitutional courts." In such cases, if the
Constitution requires a hearing at the agency level, that hearing, even
though not provided by statute, will nevertheless be governed by the
provisions respecting contested cases.2
As mentioned above, agencies are required to adopt and publish
rules governing the procedures prescribed by the act.!' In addition,
agencies are required to adopt and publish rules of practice before the
agencies, together with forms and instructions. These rules will in-
clude, of course, the rules of practice governing contested cases.
Powers of an agency, or the hearing officer designated as its agent
in conducting a hearing in a contested case, are specifically enumerated
in a provision taken from the Federal Administrative Procedure Act2
In a contested case all parties must be afforded an opportunity for
hearing after reasonable notice. The notice, in addition to stating the
time and place of the hearing, must also state the issues involved,
unless, by the nature of the proceeding, the issues cannot be fully
stated in advance of the hearing, in which case they shall be stated as
soon as practicable thereafter. The parties are guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to present evidence and argument with respect to the issues
involved, and the agency is directed to compile an official record of
the testimony and exhibits and to make that record available to any
party upon the payment of the costs thereof."
The rules of evidence which govern proceedings in court are not
trative action followed by court review to determine the propriety of such action, see
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) ; Miller v. Horton, 152Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
MaHoMeEold Finane (CoDrp. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952). Cf. Fed-
eral Radio Comm'en. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933);
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). Cf. also Floyd v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 44 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.2d 563 (1954), distinguishing the
Household Finance case and holding that the courts may be given power to review
de novo the determinations of the Department of Labor and Industries because its
functions were judicial in character and of the kind which could have been given in
the first instance to the courts.
23 Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 50 (1950), holding that section
5 of the FumLAL ADnmmsTiArAn Ptoc 0 AcT, 5 U.S.C. § 1004, applies to hearings
not expressly required by statute but read into a statute to save it from constitutional
invalidity.
24 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 2 (1).
25 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 9 (2).2 6 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 9 (1).
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applicable to hearings in contested cases. Instead, the test is that of
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Effect is given
to privileges recognized by law and evidence may be excluded if it is
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.'
Records and documents in the possession of the agency of which it
desires to avail itself must be offered and made a part of the record."'
Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and, in addition,
may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within their
specialized knowledge. Parties must be notified of the material so
noticed and given an opportunity to contest the facts.'
Other provisions of the act relating to the decisional process attempt
to ensure that the officials authorized to decide the case are made
aware of the issues involved, the evidence in the record, and the con-
tentions of the parties with respect thereto. Thus, in any case in which
the officials who are to render the final decision have not heard or read
the evidence, a decision adverse to a party shall not be made unless
that party is first served with a proposed decision, including findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and afforded opportunity to file excep-
tions and present written argument to a majority of the officials who
are to render the final decision. 0 The final decision adverse to a party
must be in writing and contain concise statements of each fact found
as well as the conclusions of law.3'
Related to these provisions governing contested cases is the section
authorizing an agency to issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the
applicability to any state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable
by it."2 Such a ruling, if issued after argument and stated to be binding,
is binding upon both the agency and the petitioner unless altered or
set aside by a court. It should be noted that while this section permits
agencies to make declaratory rulings, the language of the section is
permissive and does not require the agency to make a binding declara-
tory ruling.
Provisions Relating to Judicial Review. The validity of any rule
may be determined upon petition for a declaratory judgment thereon,
filed in the Superior Court for Thurston County, when it appears that
2 7 WashL Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 10 (1).
28 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 10 (2).
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 10 (4).
80 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 11.
31 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 12.
22 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § &
19591
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the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or immediately
threatens to interfere with, the legal rights or privileges of the peti-
tioner." In such a proceeding the court may declare the rule invalid
only if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions, exceeds the
statutory authority of the agency, or was adopted without compliance
with required rule-making procedures. 4 Thus the section does not
provide a vehicle for obtaining declaratory judgments concerning the
applicability of rules to particular fact situations. In this respect the
provision may be narrower than the provisions of the existing Declara-
tory Judgments Act," and a question may arise as to whether that act
has been rendered inoperable in this area by the general provision of
the Administrative Procedures Act repealing all inconsistent acts or
parts of acts.3
Of course, the validity of any rule may also be determined upon
review of agency action in any contested case in which the applicability
83 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 7.
34 Section 7 (2) of the act provides: "(2) In a proceeding under subsection (1) of
this section the court shall declare the rule invalid only if it finds that it violates con-
stitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or was adopted
without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures." (Emphasis added.) The
word "only" does not appear in the comparable section of the model act. It was
included in the Washington act to meet objections that the declaratory judgment pro-
visions of the model act would impose an undue burden upon state agencies by re-
quiring them to defend numerous declaratory judgment actions. See O'Connell, Effect
of Adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act on Existing Adminis-
trative Procedures in Washington, 33 WAsH. L. Rxv. 17 (1958).
35 RCW 724.010-.146.38 Cf. Tacoma v. Cavanaugh, 45 Wn2d 500, 275 P.2d 933 (1954) ; State v. Becker,
39 Wn.2d 94, 234 P.2d 897 (1951) ; Abel v. Diking & Drainage Improvement Dist.,
19 Wn2d 356, 142 P.2d 1017 (1943). The Becker case states as a general proposition
that a provision such as, "All acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby
repealed," accomplishes nothing that would not have been accomplished in its absence.
The latter two cases quote the following statement made in the Abel opinion: "Repeals
by implication are ordinarily not favored in law, and a later act will not operate to
repeal an earlier act except in such instances where the later act covers the entire
subject matter of the earlier legislation, is complete in itself, and is evidently intended
to supersede the prior legislation on the subject, or unless the two acts are so clearly
inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other that they cannot, by a fair and reason-
able construction, be reconciled and both given effect"
Of course, canons of construction such as the one just quoted have utility only to
the extent that they are a guide to the legislative intent. They never should be applied
mechanically so as to defeat an otherwise apparent legislative purpose.
If the purpose of the State Administrative Procedure Act is, as stated in the
Prefactory Note to the model act, 9C UNn0oitm LAWS ANN. 177, to protect those
subject to regulation by agencies by making provision for advance determination of
the validity of administrative rules and assuring a proper scope of judicial review of
administrative orders, there is no conflict with the purpose in preserving a broader or
more extensive review under an existing statute. This view is supported by the statu-
tory language of section 7 (2) of the Washington act which makes the word "only"
applicable solely to proceedings under section 7 (1) of the act. On the other hand, if
the insertion of the word "only" in section 7 (2) is taken as a manifestation of an
intent to restrict the former availability of declaratory judgments rather than as a
clarification of the scope of section 7 (1) that intention should prevail. The former
view seems preferable to these authors.
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or validity of that rule was involved. Review in this context goes not
only to constitutionality, statutory authority, and compliance with rule-
making requirements, but also to the applicability of the rule to a
particular state of facts.
The provisions relating to judicial review in contested cases are of
great importance. They offer an opportunity to eliminate the chaos
and confusion created by the many and varied review provisions found
in the various statutes dealing with particular agencies." Moreover,
there is clear evidence of an attempt to substitute a single uniform
review provision for the many inconsistent and varied review provi-
sions which formerly existed. The Washington act, like the act adopted
in Maryland, 8 does not contain a savings clause set out in the model
act which would have preserved the existing methods of review. 9 That
clause was bracketed by the draftsmen of the model act to ensure con-
sideration of its deletion. Moreover, the word "only" was added to
the review provision of the Washington act to ensure the uniformity
of an exclusive review provision for those cases falling within the
definition of a contested case. Accordingly, while some doubt may
exist as to the efficacy of the general repeal provision of the act oper-
ating upon specific provisions of specialized statutes, the prudent
course for counsel is to seek review pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act and eschew reliance upon other review
provisions.'0 As will be seen, the review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act provide adequate protection to the interests of a
client.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, review of an agency de-
cision in a contested case must be sought within thirty days, unless the
agency has established a procedure for rehearing or reconsideration
37For a discussion of the hopeless confusion and chaos found in the individual
review provisions respecting various agencies, see Peck, The Scope of Judicial Review
of Administrative Action in Washington, 33 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1958).
MD. CoDE AN. c. 41, § 255 (a) (1957).
Section 12 (1) of the MODEL ADmiNISTRATVE PRocEnntm AcT, which is the
comparable provision, reads:
(1) Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether
such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial
review thereof under this act [but nothing in this section shall be deemed
to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief or trial de novo,
provided by law.]
40 Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), holding under the Emergency
Price Control Act that the validity of a price regulation could not be challenged in a
criminal proceeding brought on an indictment for violation of the regulation where
the act provided a separate and exclusive means of review.
1959]
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and that procedure has been invoked.' In the latter case, review must
be sought within thirty days after the agency has acted upon the peti-
tion for rehearing or reconsideration. The venue provision of the act
represents a compromise between those forces which believe that
review should be available to parties in the counties of their residence
or place of business and those forces which believe that the specialized
problems of administrative law can better be dealt with by the bench
of Thurston County, where previous statutes have centralized much
of the review of administrative action. Accordingly, the act preserves
the former venue provisions with respect to review,2 and leaves to
future legislation the accomplishment of a more rational distribution.
Likewise preserved are the special provisions governing stay or super-
sedeas of an agency decision, though a general provision has been made
authorizing the agency or the court to order a stay in cases not gov-
erned by any specialized statute."
The review of agency determinations in contested cases provided
by the act is a record review." The court does not take additional
evidence,' nor does it redetermine factual matters de novo. Instead,
the review of factual findings is guided by the standard of material
and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Of
course, the court may also set aside agency decisions which are in
violation of constitutional provisions, in excess of statutory authority,
made upon unlawful procedure, affected by other error of law, or are
arbitrary and capricious.
More detailed consideration of the judicial review provisions of the
Model Administrative Procedure Act may be found in the authorities
cited above.' 6
41 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 13 (1). The provision relating to agency pro-
cedure for reconsideration or rehearing is not found in the model act.
42 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 13 (2).
43 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 13 (3). The provision preserving special pro-
visions governing stay or supersedeas is not found in the model act.
44 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 13 (6). At this point it may be noted that
elimination of the word "competent' from Sections 13 (6) (e) would appear to avoid
perpetuation of the Residuum rule in this state. See Leggerini v. Department of Un-
employment Comp., 15 Wn.2d 618, 131 P2d 729 (1942). For a discussion of the rule
and its preservation by the word "competent" in the romparable provision of the model
act, see Schwartz, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 WASH. L. Rr.
1, 16 (1958).
45Indeed, Section 12 (5) of the model act, which would have permitted a remand
to the agency'for the taking of additional evidence upon a showing of good reason for
failure to produce it before the agency, was eliminated in the state act. The deletion
of this provision appears unfortunate.
46 See note 4 supra.
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The provisions of the act relating to contested cases become effective
six months after its enactment, or on September 23, 1959."
Exceptions From the Coverage of tke Act. The exceptions from the
coverage of the act are fortunately few.48 However, in most instances
the exceptions would appear to be unjustified and it may be hoped
that as experience with the operation of the act is accumulated, the
opposition of the agencies and the regulated industries may disappear
and permit the elimination of most of the exceptions.
The only agencies enjoying a complete exemption from the act are
the State Militia, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, and the
Liquor Control Board. While there may be justification for exemption
of the former two, the only rationale for the exemption of the Liquor
Control Board is the judicially accepted," but intellectually discred-
ited"0 concept that traffic in liquor is a semi-legitimate business, which
is at most a privilege not entitled to judicial protection. All of the
practical problems of regulating the sale of liquors could be solved, if
indeed they are so grave, by an emergency power to suspend licenses
or issue orders, thus obviating the reasons for a complete exemption.8
Exempt from the provisions governing contested cases are the Board
of Industrial Insurance Appeals, the State Board of Equalization, the
Insurance Commissioner, and the State Tax Commission. 2 The history
of jury review of workmen's compensation awards affords a doubtful
47 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 18.
,SWash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 15. Complete exemptions were made in the
comparable Oregon legislation for the State Board of Parole and Probation, the
Public Utility Commissioner, the State Tax Commission, the Civil Service Commis-
sion, the Department of Finance and Administration, the Department of Motor
Vehicles, and the State Industrial Accident Commission. ORE. Rxv. STAT. § 183.310
(41 9 ,ate ex rel Puyallup v. Superior Court, 50 Wash. 650, 97 Pac. 778 (1908) ; State
cx rel Aberdeen v. Superior Court, 44 Wash. 526, 87 Pac. 818 (1906).
50 See GmLHoRN & BYsE, A rnmsTRAvx LAw, CASES A D ComMnNTs 768-779
(1954). As the authors state on page 773, "It is only by an act of faith, however, that
one reaches the conclusion that a quack doctor or shyster lawyer has less opportunity
'for the infliction of general and substantial injury' to the public than has, let us say,
the proprietor of a tavern; or that the latter does not serve a purpose which poten-
tially is socially as useful as that of the insurance broker or the manufacturer of near
beerm "
But see also, In re Flynn, 52 Wn2d 589, 328 P.2d 150 (1958), a case involving
revocation of a dentists license, in which the majority of the court rejected an argu-
ment based upon the privilege concept, quoting and applying the following language
from Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n. 5 (1957), "We need
not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.'
Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is
characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing
except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's
grace:'
:1 Cf. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).52 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 15.
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basis for the exemption of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals."'
The exemption of the State Board of Equalization from the provisions
governing contested cases would also appear to be unnecessary for the
reason that the activities in which it engages"4 are properly character-
ized as rule-making." No justification appears for the exemptions of
the Insurance Commissioner or the State Tax Commission. Indeed, it
may be wondered whether the State Tax Commission may not face a
day of reckoning when some taxpayer finds it advantageous to point
out that agency's consistent refusal to accord the word "hearing" in
pertinent statutes"8 its normal and accepted statutory meaning.Y
Finally, the Department of Public Assistance is exempt from those
provisions of the act relating to petitions for modification of rules,
declaratory judgments, and declaratory rulings.5 8
Unfinished Work. Enactment of legislation such as the Administra-
tive Procedures Act is only the starting point for improvement of
administrative law in Washington. Much, of course, depends upon
the cooperation and willingness of the governed agencies to accept and
be guided by the provisions of the act. Much also depends upon the
vigilance of the practicing bar in ensuring that agency action affecting
their clients has been taken in accordance with the provisions of the
act. And much depends upon the state judiciary, which, it is to be
hoped, will give to the act the hospitable treatment which the federal
judiciary has extended to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 9
This is not to say that the work of the legislature has been com-
pleted. Much remains to be done there also. Among other things, it
is to be hoped that subsequent sessions of the legislature will take
proper account of the existence of the Administrative Procedures Act
and refrain from enacting subsequent legislation with inconsistent
provisions.' The unjustified exemptions from the act mentioned above
53 Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals after Nine Years: A Partial
Evaluation, 33 WAsH. L. REV. 80, 94-99 (1958); Rutledge, A New Tribunal of the
State of Washington, 26 WAsH. L. REv. 196, 207-211 (1951).
54 RCW 84.48.080.55 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).56 RCW 82.32.160-.170; RCW 84.08.140.
57 Cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 479-481 (1936).58 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 234, § 15.
5 E.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
60 Of course authority can be found for the proposition that one session of the
legislature cannot abridge the power of a succeeding legislature by prescribing the
mode of effecting repeal of existing law, Great No. Ry. v. Glover, 194 Wash. 146, 77
P.2d 598 (1938). However, a sympathetic treatment of the Administrative Procedures
Act will require a very clear showing of an attempt to effect a subsequent departure
from its provisions. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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should be eliminated. The present act is deficient in its failure to
provide adequately for separation of the functions of judge and prose-
cutor. Unlike the federal act, neither the model act nor the Washington
act deal with the very important problem of establishing a panel of
hearing examiners, independent and free from control by the agencies
involved in the cases which they hear." The compromise provision
with respect to the venue for review of agency action must be replaced
by a provision making an intelligent selection of those cases which
require review in Thurston County and those cases which may more
properly be heard in the county of the petitioner's residence or place
of business. Provision should be made with respect to the availability
of subpoenas in contested cases, and for their enforcement upon peti-
tion to the superior courts. While case authority is to the contrary, 2
it is difficult to see how in fact a fair hearing can be afforded to one
whose rights, duties, or privileges are to be determined if he cannot
compel the production of evidence in his favor. In addition to the
provisions concerning publication of rules, provision must also be made
for the publication, indexing, and digesting of the decisions of agencies
in contested cases.6 8 Finally, when sufficient experience has been
obtained at the state level, an assault must be made upon the intol-
erable situation of administrative law which exists at the county and
city level.
PHIp A. TRAUTmAN
CORNELIUS J. PECK
Counties-Coordination of Administrative Procedures. By chap-
ter 130 of the 1959 Session Laws the legislature has recognized the
necessity and desirability of coordinating the administrative programs
of the counties.
The assessor, auditor, clerk, coroner, sheriff, superintendent of
schools, treasurer, and prosecuting attorney of each county are directed
to take such action as they jointly deem necessary to effect the co-
ordination of the administrative programs of the county. They are
also to submit joint reports to the governor and legislature biennially
61 For a discussion of this problem, see Schwartz, The Model Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 33 WASH. L. REv. 1, at 11-13 (1958).
,62 Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926). See GELLHoRN & BYSE,
ArnINIWv LAw, CASES AND COMmENTS 628-640 (1954).63 Section 3 (b) of the Fm.L AmiNISTmATmVE PRocEDunE AcT, 5 U.S.C. § 1002
(b) provides: "Every agency shall publish or, in accordance with published rule,
make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of
cases (except those required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as
precedents) and all rules."
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recommending procedural changes to increase the efficiency of the
respective departments. The county officials are empowered to use the
Washington state association of elected county officials as a coordi-
nating body through which the duties imposed by the act may be
performed, harmonized or correlated.
Potentially much may be accomplished under this act in the way
of eliminating duplication of facilities and functions within a county,
thereby saving time and money. If more harmony can be obtained
within each county in the activities of the elected officials and also
among the several counties, all will benefit. In the end, whether the
potential benefits will be obtained will depend upon the cooperation,
interest, and zeal of the county officials. Certainly, however, the ex-
pression by the legislature of its wishes, combined with the direction
to the county officials to implement such policy, is to be commended.
PHmLip A. TRAuTmA
COMMERCIAL LAW
Small Loan Companies. In 1941, the Washington legislature
enacted the Uniform Small Loan Law with certain modifications.'
Eighteen years later, the 1959 legislature made some important changes
in the 1941 act by the enactment of chapter 212, Session Laws of 1959.
Originally limited to loans of $500.00 or less, the maximum amount
has now been increased to $,1000.00.2 The license application fee has
been increased from $50.00 to $100.00, and the maximum cost of
examining each licensed place of business is now $250.00 instead of
$150.00.' Protection against misleading or deceptive advertising has
been extended to include television.' Licensees are still permitted to
charge three percent per month on loan balances of $300.00, or less,
but the rate on balances in excess of $300.00 and not in excess of
$500.00 is now one and one-half percent per month, and over $500.00
it is one percent per month. As before, "in lieu of such charges a
licensee may charge one dollar per month, or fraction thereof, when
1 Wash. Sess. Laws 1941, c. 208; for an excellent analysis of the 1941 act, see
Shattuck, Regulation of Small Loans in Washington, 16 WAsH. L. RIv. 117, 124
(1941).2 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 212, § 1, amending RCW 31.08.020.
3 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 212, § 2, amending RCW 31.08.030.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 212, § 3, amending RCW 31.08.130.
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 212, § 4, amending RCW 31.08.150.
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